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MATHEMATICS, METAPHORS AND ECONOMIC 
VISUALISABILITY 
 
The mathematisation of economic theory is an issue that has been discussed many times. 
These discussions have been dominated by debate about the appropriateness of the 
deductive method for economics. This rather narrow focus has pushed a number of 
important methodological issues regarding the nature of mathematical economics aside. 
In this paper, it is argued that mathematical economics involves the construction of 
metaphor and is therefore metaphorical in nature. Whilst mathematical economics has 
been responsible for what are generally regarded to be notable theoretical achievements 
and retains a place in economics as an apparatus for the development of economic 
science, the meaning of mathematical economics is restricted to those elements of 
economic reality that may be talked about in terms of mathematical objects and there is a 
danger of declining economic visualisability as the metaphors of mathematical 
economics become less vivid.  
 
Keywords: mathematical economics, metaphors, economic visualisability 
JEL codes: A10, B40, C60  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the nineteenth century, scholars trained in both mathematics and political economy began 
to construct economic theory in mathematical form. Over the course of the next half century, 
mathematical analysis gradually came to be applied, sometimes implicitly and often relegated 
to appendices and footnotes, in more and more parts of economic theory. Then, quite 
suddenly, in the years immediately following the Second World War, the mathematisation of 
economic theory gathered pace. So forceful and all-encompassing was the subsequent 
transformation in the way in which economic theory was constructed that a mere three 
decades later it would be difficult to find a branch of economic theory untouched by 
mathematical analysis.  
 
Despite the pervasiveness of mathematics in economic theory, many important 
methodological issues relevant to the deployment of mathematics in economics remain 
untouched in the economics literature. Part of the reason for this is that debate over the 
utilisation of mathematics in economics has been narrowly focussed on the appropriateness of 
the deductive method—the proof of many theorems that logically flow from a few axioms. As 
a consequence of this narrow focus, the nature and role of mathematics in the development of 
 2
economic science and knowledge has not received the attention that it deserves. Important 
fundamental questions have gone unanswered. What does mathematical economics mean? 
What is its nature? Can it help solve any economic problem? Does it do more harm than 
good? Despite Samuelson’s (1952) declaration that ‘Mathematics is language,’ there have 
been only a few attempts to explore such questions using the tools of linguistic theory and 
cognitive psychology.  
 
In this paper, it is shown how linguistic theory and the closely related investigations of 
cognitive psychologists illuminate the path that must be taken to generate answers to the 
questions that the utilisation of mathematics in economics has posed for economists. 
Mathematical models in economic theory, like all models in science, involve the construction 
of metaphor. The models are not literally true. Mathematical economics creates analogies 
between economic elements and mathematical objects that compel economists to think about 
their principal subject (economic reality) in terms of a subsidiary subject (mathematics). In 
this way mathematical economics may generate new insights about the nature and operation 
of the economic system or identify previously undiscovered connections between elements of 
economic reality. Importantly, the metaphorical nature of mathematical economics means that 
mathematical economics must be judged, not just on the rigour of its proofs, but on the 
appropriateness of the analogies it creates between mathematical objects and elements of 
economic reality.  
  
There are no set criteria for judging the appropriateness of mathematical metaphors. 
However, an especially important property of metaphor is its ability to invoke images in the 
minds of readers or listeners. These images may be either clear diagrammatic pictures or they 
may be images of a more kinaesthetic or intuitive nature. In this paper, the image-invoking 
property of metaphor is called visualisability. Good metaphors in everyday language and in 
science are vivid metaphors. Vivid metaphors provide an effective way of communicating 
new scientific discoveries. More importantly, when it comes to the particular case of 
mathematical economic theory, visualisability means vivid connections between 
mathematical objects and economic elements. Visualisability is an important property of 
metaphor that demands the consideration of economists. This is especially the case given the 
increasing utilisation of abstract mathematics in modern economic theory. With increasing 
abstraction, the connections between mathematical objects and economic elements may 
become clouded and stretched and this might potentially undermine the effectiveness of 
mathematical metaphors in economics. 
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This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, a definition of metaphor is presented and the 
necessary linguistic theory is introduced. In Section 3, the metaphorical nature of 
mathematical economics is discussed. A delimitation of metaphor is applied to mathematical 
economics to provide support for the claim that mathematical economic theory involves 
metaphor construction. In Section 4, the argument that mathematical economics and literary 
economics are strictly equivalent is examined. Although this argument is raised in many 
discussions about mathematics in economics, it is wrong. Mathematical and literary 
economics are not strictly equivalent. Mathematical economics has a non-literal, metaphorical 
quality that does not have a strict equivalent within the realms of plain (literal) prose. In 
Section 5, the ways in which metaphor can help to advance understanding are discussed. In 
Section 6, the ways in which metaphor may retard understanding are discussed. In Section 7, 
the importance of economic visualisability is identified. The paper is concluded with Section 
8.  
 
2 METAPHOR 
 
Metaphor is one category of non-literal or figurative language. In a metaphor, an object or 
event is described using concepts that cannot be applied to that object or event in a 
conventional way (Indurkhya, 1992). The object or event that is described is called the 
principal subject and the concept that cannot be applied to that object or event in a 
conventional way is called the subsidiary subject. Some examples of metaphor are provided 
below: 
  
(a) My lawyer is a shark 
(b) Rising unemployment in this city is a time bomb 
(c) The king is a lion 
(d) The death of literature; and, from Shakespeare 
(e) Juliet is the sun; and  
(f) All the world’s a stage 
And all the men and women merely players 
 
In written or spoken language, metaphors generally introduce a marked contrast between the 
words used metaphorically in a sentence and the words used literally. For example, in the 
metaphorical expression, “Rising unemployment in this city is a time bomb,” there is a 
distinct contrast between ‘time bomb’ and the remaining words in the sentence. The contrast 
arises because ‘time bomb’ cannot be applied to the phenomenon of rising unemployment in a 
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meaningful way whilst retaining its literal meaning (as an explosive device triggered by a 
timing mechanism).  
 
Although the pervasive utilisation of metaphor in human language raises many important 
questions, the dominant theme in the literature is meaning. Reading through the list of 
metaphorical expressions (above), one can understand what is meant by them. These 
metaphorical expressions have meaning. The important problem for scholars is to provide an 
explanation for that meaning. In the exegesis of metaphor, two predominant categories of 
theory have emerged: (1) monistic theory; and (2) dualistic theory. Monistic theorists contend 
that words used metaphorically do not keep their antecedent literal meaning and refer only to 
their new non-literal context. Dualistic theorists, on the other hand, contend that words used 
metaphorically maintain a dual reference to both their antecedent literal context and a new 
non-literal context (Mooij, 1976). Dualistic theories have emerged as those most likely to 
provide solutions to the problems that metaphor poses for linguistic theorists, philosophers, 
psychologists and methodologists.  
 
The most straightforward dualistic theory is the substitution view. According to the 
substitution view, metaphors are simply substitutes for literal expressions. For example, the 
speaker who uses the metaphorical expression, “The death of literature,” could, according to 
the substitution view, have used a literal expression that means the same thing. The word 
‘death’ in this case communicates something that could have been expressed literally. The 
metaphor is simply used in a novel or poetic way to decorate and embellish one’s speech. The 
substitution view implies that metaphorical expression performs no greater function than to 
please and amuse readers or listeners. Once scholars came to realise, however, that metaphors 
may perform a more important and complex role in the communication of ideas it was 
necessary to develop an alternative theory of metaphor. We find one such attempt in what has 
been called a special case of the substitution theory: the comparison theory.    
 
The comparison view is one of the most popular dualistic theories of metaphor. According to 
comparison theory, metaphor is abridged or implicit comparison between principal subject 
and subsidiary subject (Mooij, 1976). A proponent of the comparison view holds that 
metaphor is the presentation of an analogy or similarity (Black, 1955).  Consider the meaning 
of the metaphor, “My lawyer is a shark.” According to a comparison theorist, the speaker who 
says that his lawyer is a shark wants to tell his listener something about the lawyer. Rather 
than formally compare his lawyer to an aggressive, vicious, brutal, tenacious and fierce 
creature, the speaker presents the analogy in the form of this non-literal or figurative 
expression (Glucksberg, Newsome and Goldvarg, 2001). The listener, if he detects the 
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analogy between the lawyer and the shark, may determine the speaker’s intended (literal) 
meaning (Black, 1955).  
 
The comparison theorists recognise the importance of analogy in metaphor and, as mentioned 
previously, view metaphor as the presentation of a similarity or analogy. At first this appears 
to be quite an attractive theory but there is a problem. If a metaphor states that “A is B,” there 
must, according to the comparison view, be some a priori literal resemblance between the 
principal subject A and the subsidiary subject B. The articulation of the resemblance, analogy 
or similarity in a metaphorical expression could, if the comparison view is correct, be held to 
be a surrogate for a formal comparison (Black, 1955). This is troublesome for the following 
reason. There is often no a priori literal resemblance between A and B. Before the metaphor 
is constructed there is no possibility for formal comparison of A with B. It is the metaphor 
that creates the similarity or analogy (Black, 1955). This leads us to the interaction theory of 
metaphor.   
 
In the interaction view of metaphor, rather than being seen as comparisons based upon a pre-
existing analogy or similarity, metaphors are supposed to create or induce analogies between 
principal subject and subsidiary subject. The principal subject and subsidiary subject are 
regarded as systems rather than isolated words (Indurkhya, 1992). For example, in the 
metaphorical expression, “The king is a lion,” it is not just the word ‘lion’ but all our 
knowledge and beliefs about lions that act on the principal subject (the king). This knowledge 
and these beliefs are the systems of the two subjects (Indurkhya, 1992). Upon hearing or 
reading a metaphorical expression, the system of the subsidiary subject—all of the reader or 
listener’s knowledge and beliefs about the subsidiary subject—interacts with the system of 
the principal subject—all of the reader or listener’s knowledge and beliefs about the principal 
subject—in the listener or reader’s thoughts. The result of this interaction is that the principal 
subject looks more similar to the subsidiary subject. A similarity or analogy is created.  
 
The interaction view implies that there is no simple basis for metaphor. Metaphor is not 
simply the presentation of a pre-existing analogy or similarity between principal subject and 
subsidiary subject but has a more important role in the communication of ideas and is 
possessed of a more complex cognitive function. Words utilised metaphorically fulfil a 
cognitive role that is not equivalent to the function fulfilled by possible literal surrogates. In 
metaphor, the systems of the principal subject and subsidiary subject work together or 
interact. As a result, attributes of the subsidiary subject are acquired by the principal subject 
and the reader or listener comes to understand the principal subject in a new and different 
way. Metaphor was once viewed as a purely literary phenomenon. Whilst the interaction view 
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of metaphor must be complemented by the experimental and theoretical investigations of 
cognitive psychologists to provide a complete exposition of metaphor meaning and 
comprehension, the interaction view has made it clear that metaphor is not simply a part of 
the way in which people speak but also a part of the way in which people think.  
 
3 MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS AND METAPHOR 
 
The role of metaphor in economics has been recognised by several distinguished contributors 
to the literature, including McCloskey (1983, pp. 502-507), Mirowski (1994) and Klamer and 
Leonard (1994). The discussions presented by McCloskey and the other authors draw upon 
some of the same linguistic theory that was presented in the previous section of this paper. In 
particular, the interaction theory acquires a place of prominence not only because of its 
usefulness in explaining how metaphors work but also because of its bringing to the forefront 
of the analysis the ‘cognitive’ role of metaphor. McCloskey (1983, p.503) and Klamer and 
Leonard (1994, pp.27-30) recognise that metaphors are not ‘ornamental’ but play an 
important and useful cognitive role. In particular, the role that metaphor performs as the 
vehicle of ‘mutually advantageous’ illumination of ideas from different contexts is 
highlighted. This paper complements these existing contributions to the literature on 
metaphor and economics by exploring slightly more fully, and more formally, the particular 
case of mathematical economics as metaphor.  
 
A basic interaction view of mathematical economics as metaphor may proceed as follows. 
Consider the statement, “The list of commodity prices is a vector in commodity space.” A 
person who speaks of a vector is referring to a mathematical object with certain properties. 
Likewise, a person who speaks of a list of commodity prices is referring to an economic 
element with certain properties. As described above, the metaphor invokes two systems: (1) 
all of the listener’s knowledge and beliefs about vectors; and (2) all of the listener’s 
knowledge and beliefs about the list of commodity prices. These two systems interact in the 
listener’s thoughts. Providing that the metaphor is appropriate, the suitable listener will be 
able to make the assertions implied in the metaphor fit the principal subject (Black, 1955). 
The result is that the list of commodity prices in the economic system looks more like a 
vector.  
 
Whilst the interaction view sheds some light on the operation of mathematical metaphors in 
economics, it does not explain on its own how the mathematical metaphors are processed or 
comprehended. Black (1979a, p.192) explains, “The chief weakness of the ‘interaction 
theory’, which I still regard as better than its alternatives, is lack of clarification of what it 
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means to say that in a metaphor one thing is thought of (or viewed) as another thing…. To 
think of God as love and to take the further step of identifying the two is emphatically to do 
something more than to compare them as merely being alike in certain respects. But what that 
‘something more’ is remains tantalizingly elusive: we lack an adequate account of 
metaphorical thought.” The investigation of metaphor processing and comprehension has 
been an ongoing research program for much of the past twenty-five years. It has attracted the 
attention of literary theorists, cognitive psychologists and psycho-linguistic experimentalists. 
The result has been the development and experimental analysis of a number of different 
models of metaphor processing and comprehension.  
 
The standard pragmatic model1, which was among the earliest models developed, proposes 
that metaphor comprehension takes place in distinct phases in which (1) the listener 
determines the literal meaning of the statement; (2) the listener decides if the literal meaning 
is the intended meaning of the statement; and (3) if the listener decides that the literal 
meaning is inappropriate he or she must determine the metaphorical meaning (Gibbs and 
Gerrig, 1989, p.146). However, the results of experiments to test the validity of the standard 
pragmatic model have generally been inconsistent with the model (Ortony, Schallert, 
Reynolds and Antos, 1978). That is, the participants in these experiments did not take longer 
to comprehend a metaphorical statement than a literal statement. If metaphor comprehension 
follows an attempt to first determine the literal meaning, metaphors should take longer to 
comprehend than literal statements (Gibbs and Gerrig, 1989, p.147). This has been found not 
to be the case.  
 
Whilst it may now be possible to conclude that metaphor comprehension does not occur in 
distinct phases, it remains to be seen whether the same or different mental processes facilitate 
the comprehension of metaphorical expressions and literal expressions. We still need an 
answer for question concerning what is happening in the mind of the listener as he or she 
attempts to comprehend a metaphorical expression. A number of models have been 
developed. These include category-based models (see Keysar and Glucksberg (1992) and 
Thomas and Mareschal (2001)), comparison-based models (see Chiappe and Kennedy (2001) 
and Gagne (2002)), mapping models (Gentner and Bowdle (2001)) and conceptual models 
(see Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Gibbs (1992) and Coulson and Matlock (2001)). Whilst 
research is ongoing, most of the challenges faced in the development of metaphor processing 
models appear to be mitigated by the deployment of conceptual models (Ritchie, 2003). In 
conceptual models, ‘cross-domain mappings’ are accorded a place of prominence.   
                                                 
1 See Searle (1979).  
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 The conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) developed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggests 
that metaphors are the output of a cognitive process that involves the systematic—rather than 
ad hoc—utilization of pre-existing cross-domain mappings in which we understand the 
principal domain by exploiting an analogically related subject, the subsidiary domain 
(Coulson and Matlock, 2001, p.297). CMT explains why, for example, groups of 
metaphorical expressions have emerged that all (systematically) explain life (the principal 
domain) in terms of a journey (subsidiary domain): ‘He’s at the cross-roads,’ ‘It’s been a 
long, hard road,’ ‘Look how far she’s come’ (Gibbs, 1992, p.573). According to Coulson and 
Matlock (2001, p.297), “The systematicity in the use of [subsidiary] and [principal] domain 
terminology derives from the fact that some of the logic of the [subsidiary] domain has been 
imported into the [principal domain] in a way that maintains the mappings from one to the 
other.”  Metaphors are processed and comprehended by inviting the systematic deployment of 
pre-existing cross-domain mappings. This deployment is the interaction referred to 
imprecisely in the interaction view of metaphor.  
 
Let us apply CMT to mathematical economics. Consider the standard individual utility 
function deployed in microeconomic theory: 
 
( nXXXUutility ,...,, 21= )            (1) 
  
According to CMT, the metaphorical re-description of individual satisfaction in the context of 
choice among combinations of X’s invites the listener or reader to utilize pre-existing cross-
domain mappings such that he or she understands the principal domain in terms of the 
analogically related subsidiary domain. CMT explains why, for example, functions are 
systematically deployed in mathematical economics. This is because some of the logic of 
functions has been imported into the principal domain (economics) such that mappings can be 
maintained from one metaphorical re-description of an economic element as a function to the 
next. Hence, “[Mathematical economics] is the manifestation of conceptual structure 
organized by a cross-domain mapping—a systematic set of correspondences between the 
source and target that result when cognitive models from a particular [subsidiary] domain are 
used to conceptualize a given [principal] domain” (Coulson and Matlock, 2001, p.297). This 
is how mathematical metaphors in economics work.  
 
Certain questions arise at this point. “How do we recognise a metaphor?” and “How can we 
be sure that mathematics in economics is metaphorical in nature?” The identification of 
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metaphor is not an easy task. Whilst some scholars believe that a diagnostic tool might be 
developed to fulfil this duty, others have suggested that the identification of metaphor relies to 
a large extent on our knowledge of what is to be a metaphorical statement and an assessment 
of whether a metaphorical reading is preferred to a literal one (Black, 1979b). But however 
imperfect a set of diagnostic criteria might be, the metaphorical nature of mathematical 
economics may still be appreciated more fully through the application of a delimitation of 
metaphor.  
 
One such delimitation of metaphor is extant in the literature. This is Mooij’s (1976) set of 
criteria that may be deployed to identify metaphor. According to Mooij (1976, p.26), a 
statement can be classed as metaphorical if: 
 
(a) The context in which the statement is made makes it clear that the statement is 
substantially about a certain principal subject, A. 
(b) The words, W, whose metaphoricalness is under discussion, have a field of literal 
descriptive meaning, F. 
(c) These words W are used in the statement in such a way that at least part of their 
function seems to be a direct description, characterisation or indication of certain 
aspects of A. 
(d) Although A and F may only be vaguely circumscribed, it has to be clear that the 
aspects of A meant in (c) do not show the features F. 
(e) The statement is not to be interpreted as simply false, inappropriate or nonsensical 
(which it would be on the basis of a literal reading of W), because it is understandable 
as a contribution to the discourse about A. The metaphorical words do not only seem 
to give information about A, according to (c), but they actually help to do so.  
 
To Mooij’s (1976) schema may be added an additional criterion. This additional criterion 
reflects what has been said in the previous section on the theory of metaphor, particularly the 
interaction view. 
 
(f) Upon reading or listening to the statement an analogy or similarity between the 
principal subject and subsidiary subject is illuminated or becomes apparent or, to be 
more precise, we are invited to systematically utilize a pre-existing cross-domain 
mapping.  
 
Whilst this set of criteria might be applied to the written and spoken statements that one 
comes across in everyday life, it need not do so exclusively. This delimitation of metaphor 
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may be applied just as easily to the sentences, words and equations of mathematical economic 
theory. Mooij (1976, p.26) confirms that this delimitation may apply whenever F is not 
realised within A. In mathematical economics, the mathematics has a field of literal 
(mathematical) meaning that is certainly not realised within the principal subject (economic 
elements). Vectors, for example, have a field of literal mathematical meaning as elements of a 
vector space. This field of literal mathematical meaning is not realised in the economic 
elements that vectors are sometimes used to explain.  
 
To apply Mooij’s (1976) schema, some examples are required from mathematical economics. 
The papers of Debreu (1984; 1991) on the mathematisation of economic theory provide a 
ready source of examples. In his summary of the mathematisation of economic theory, Gerard 
Debreu explained how the problem of determining the existence of general equilibrium was 
approached by him and others. Significantly, the development of a successful solution to the 
problem relies on the creation of an analogy between the list of commodities in the economic 
system and a mathematical object called a vector space. Debreu (1984, p.268) explained:  
 
“One makes a list of all the commodities in the economy. Let l be their finite number. 
Having chosen a unit of measurement for each one of them, a sign convention to 
distinguish inputs from outputs (for a consumer inputs are positive, outputs negative; for 
a producer inputs are negative, outputs positive), one can describe the action of an 
economic agent by a vector in the commodity space Rl. The fact that the commodity 
space has the structure of a real vector space is a basic reason for the success of the 
mathematisation of economic theory. In particular convexity properties of sets in Rl, a 
recurring theme in the theory of general economic equilibrium, can be fully exploited. If, 
in addition, one chooses a unit of account, and if one specifies the price of each one of 
the l commodities, one defines a price-vector in R1, a concept dual to that of a 
commodity-vector. The value of the commodity-vector z relative to the price-vector p is 
then the inner product p . z.” 
 
In this passage, Debreu touches on most of the main components of the general equilibrium 
analysis he and others helped to develop. Consider the following statements: (1) the 
environment in which agents undertake their economic actions is a commodity (vector) space; 
(2) the action of an economic agent is a vector in commodity space; (3) the prices of 
commodities are a vector in commodity space; and (4) the commodities in the economy are a 
vector in commodity space. These look very much like metaphors. Certainly they appear to 
create analogies between specific elements of economic reality and mathematical objects 
(vectors and vector spaces). Let us examine this in more detail.  
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Consider the specific statement, “The environment in which agents undertake their economic 
actions is a commodity vector space.” It is appropriate to choose this particular statement 
because it is really the critical analogy upon which much mathematical economic theory has 
been constructed. The application of our delimitation of metaphor to this statement yields the 
following insights: 
 
a) The context (especially the theorists’ intentions) makes it clear that the statement (the 
theory) is about a certain principal subject. The theorists’ intentions are certainly to 
tell us something about the environment in which economic agents operate. The 
theorists’ intentions are not to say something about a mathematical object. The vector 
space is the subsidiary subject;  
b) The words (or equations) whose metaphoricalness is under discussion (vector space) 
do have a field of literal (mathematical) meaning. This field of meaning can be stated 
as follows. The vector space is a set of vectors and two operations: (1) vector 
addition; and (2) scalar multiplication; 
c) The words (or equations) are used by mathematical economic theorists in such a way 
that at least part of their function seems to be a direct description, characterisation or 
indication of certain aspects of the environment in which economic agents operate.  
d) It is clear that the actual (real-world) environment in which economic agents operate 
does not literally have the features stated in (b). That is, the environment in which 
economic agents undertake their activities is not literally a set of vectors and two 
mathematical operations; 
e) The statement that the environment in which economic agents undertake their 
activities is a vector space is not dismissed as inappropriate or false because it seems 
to be an understandable contribution to the discourse on economic reality; and 
f) Upon reading or hearing the statement, an analogy or similarity becomes apparent (to 
the suitable reader or listener). If one possesses the necessary knowledge of the 
subsidiary domain (linear algebra) one can utilize a pre-existing cross-domain 
mapping and exploit the analogically related subsidiary domain to understand the 
principal domain.   
 
By creating analogies between economic elements and mathematical objects, the general 
equilibrium theory developed by Debreu and others changed the way in which economists 
thought about certain economic elements. Specifically, such economic elements as the 
environment in which agents operate and the actions of those agents attained certain attributes 
as a result of thinking about them in terms of the subsidiary subject. In this way, equilibrium 
theory may be said to involve metaphor construction.  
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 Countless other examples of mathematical metaphors in economic theory may be listed, all of 
which create analogies between mathematical objects and economic elements. For example, 
Debreu (1984; 1991) speaks about the perfect fit between the supporting hyper-plane theorem 
(subsidiary subject) and the problem that concerns the optimal state of an economy (principal 
subject) as well as the possibility of casting welfare economics (principal subject) in set-
theoretical terms (subsidiary subject). Demand and supply functions, production functions, 
utility functions, indifference curves and budget constraints. All of these pieces of 
mathematical economics, along with the others discussed in this section, create analogies 
between mathematical objects and economic elements (and invite the utilization of the cross-
domain mappings we spoke of earlier). In so doing, they compel economists to see or 
understand these economic elements in a new and different way. Mathematical economics is a 
collection of metaphors that create analogies between various mathematical objects and 
economic elements.  
 
4 THE NON-EQUIVALENCE OF MATHEMATICS AND LITERAL PROSE IN 
ECONOMICS 
 
The metaphorical nature of mathematics in economics has many implications. One of these 
implications concerns the equivalence of mathematical symbols and literary prose in 
economics. An argument that is commonly found in discussions on mathematics in economics 
and in discussion defending mathematical economics concerns the equivalence of 
mathematical symbols and literary words. Professor Paul A. Samuelson has argued, on at 
least one occasion, for the strict equivalence of mathematics and prose (see Samuelson 
(1952)) and many other mathematical economists have done likewise. Indeed, it is probably 
true to say that the equivalence of mathematical symbols and literary words has been one of 
the key arguments deployed in defence of mathematical economics.  
 
The argument that mathematical economics and literary economics are strictly equivalent 
involves an application of a substitution view of metaphor to mathematical economic theory. 
The substitution view of metaphor, as explained previously, is a basic theory of metaphor that 
views metaphorical expressions as substitutes for literal, plain English expressions. Either 
could be used with the same ultimate effect of communicating an idea. Applied to 
mathematical economics, the substitution view implies that mathematical economics is a 
surrogate for plain, literal literary economics. The only advantage is that mathematical 
economics provides a more efficient or, possibly, a more aesthetically pleasing way of 
communicating the theorist’s ideas.  
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 This view, which is expressed by Samuelson (1952), has also been expressed by Alfred 
Marshall (1890/1997, p.vi): 
 
“The chief use of pure mathematics in economic questions seems to be in 
helping a person write down quickly, shortly and exactly, some of his 
thoughts for his own use: and to make sure that he has enough, and only 
enough, premises for his conclusions.” 
 
Samuelson and Marshall express a view of mathematical economics that is fundamentally 
equivalent to a substitution view of metaphor: metaphorical expressions (mathematics in 
economics) are substitutes for literal English expressions that have an advantage of economy 
of expression. However, in light of subsequent advances in linguistic theory it is clear that the 
application of a substitution view of metaphor to mathematical economics is not wholly 
appropriate. A substitution view allows no special role for mathematics in the communication 
of economic ideas and implies that the mathematics in economics does nothing more than 
please readers and to provide a short-hand method of conveying economic theory.  
 
Samuelson (1952) has suggested that it is possible to write out in prose all of Whitehead and 
Russell’s Principia Mathematica. He is correct. The reason why this is possible is that in the 
case of pure mathematics (or logic) all that is required is a translation or substitution. For 
example, consider the mathematical function . Translated into literary words, 
means that, given a value for x, we would follow the rule of squaring that 
value and multiplying by three in order to obtain the corresponding value for y. This is 
literally what this function means. Although the task will become more arduous with more 
complicated mathematics, it will always be possible to undertake this translation or 
substitution process. In pure mathematics there is only one subject. A pure mathematician 
creates no analogies between mathematical objects and elements observed in nature. With 
regards to mathematical economic theory, however, literal translation of mathematics into 
words is no longer possible. A mathematical economist deals with two subjects 
simultaneously and creates analogies between them. In the case of mathematical economics, it 
is not translation that is required but explication. And the explication of metaphors is no easy 
task.  
23)( xxfy ==
23)( xxfy ==
 
In plain, literal prose, what does the mathematical demand function bPaQd −= mean? This 
is a far more difficult question than it first appears. Instinctively, one begins to search for an 
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economic meaning hidden within the mathematics waiting to be deciphered. However, one 
soon realises that this is a blind alley and if we continue trying to formulate an answer to the 
question until a satisfactory conclusion is reached, we shall eventually discover that what we 
have arrived at is not a literal translation of bPaQd −=  but an explication of what about the 
nature of economic reality the metaphor evokes or brings to our attention. This occurs 
because there is not a hidden economic meaning within ‘ bPaQd −= ’ that can be expressed 
in plain, literal prose. The cognitive-linguistic role that this mathematical metaphor fulfils is 
more complex than this. It makes us see elements of economic reality in a new and different 
way. The prices at which economic agents will demand certain quantities become more like a 
mathematical object called a function. This is something that plain, literal prose does not do 
(see Davidson, 1979, p.43).  
 
Mathematical metaphors in economics do not have a hidden meaning that, once deciphered, 
can be expressed in plain, literal prose. Mathematical metaphors in economics, like other 
types of metaphor, have an effect on the reader or listener (Davidson, 1979, p.43). An 
explication of mathematical metaphors in economics would therefore involve helping a less 
suitable reader or listener see what the mathematical economic theorist wants his or her 
suitable readers or listeners to see. Such cannot be accomplished by simply translating the 
mathematics into words or, equivalently, substituting plain, literal prose for the non-literal 
(mathematical) statements. In mathematical economics, mathematical symbols do not simply 
stand in as surrogates for literary words. Mathematical economics creates analogies between 
economic elements and mathematical objects. In economics there is not a strict equivalence 
between mathematics and words. The metaphorical nature of mathematical economic theory 
gives it a special function in the communication of ideas. It compels economists to see and 
think about economic elements in a new and different way.  
 
The special cognitive-linguistic function of metaphor in language is present in metaphorical 
mathematical economics. This cognitive-linguistic function is a powerful tool of language 
that can bring forth new insights or improved understanding. To suitable listeners these new 
insights may appear especially beautiful and attractive. With regards to mathematical 
economic theory, these suitable listeners will usually be other mathematical economists. Here 
lies at least part of the reason for the mathematisation of economic theory that has been 
witnessed over the past century or so. To suitable listeners, mathematical economics, 
deploying the strength of metaphor as a tool in the development of scientific understanding, 
has generated striking and beautiful results. The logic of mathematics has been imported into 
the principal domain (economics) such that mappings can be maintained from one 
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mathematical re-description of an economic element to the next. The systematic exploitation 
of this organized conceptual structure holds out the promise of more, equally beautiful results. 
This has contributed to the considerable allure of mathematics to some theorists and has been 
responsible for the acceptance of mathematical results as advancements in our knowledge 
about the economic system. 
 
5 METAPHOR AND ADVANCES IN UNDERSTANDING  
 
The view had long been held that metaphors have no place in science or even in serious 
discourse. There are many well-known philosopher opponents of metaphor, including 
Hobbes, Nietzsche, Mauthner, Flaubert and Robbe-Grillet (Mooij, 1976). Most notable, 
perhaps, is Locke whose disdain of metaphor is reflected in the passage reproduced below: 
 
‘Since wit and fancy finds easier entertainment in the world, than dry truth and real 
knowledge, figurative speeches and allusions in language will hardly be admitted as an 
imperfection or abuse of it. I confess, in discourses where we seek rather pleasure and 
delight than information and improvement, such ornaments as are borrowed from them 
can scarce pass for faults. But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow 
that all the art of rhetorick, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative 
application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong 
ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgement, and so indeed are perfect 
cheats.’  (Locke, 1824, Book 3, Ch.10, §34)  
   
Even Aristotle, who thought ‘by far the most important matter is to have skill in the use of 
metaphor,’ (Poetics, 1459a) expressed caution about the harm to understanding that might be 
caused by its misuse. However, the view that metaphors have no role in the development of 
science and knowledge is changing, though in economics the issue has not really been widely 
discussed. 
 
In science in general, metaphors might fulfil a number of important functions. At a most 
fundamental level metaphors provide a vehicle for the communication of new scientific 
theories (Boyd, 1979). However, it is also widely believed that metaphors are actually 
essential to the construction of theories. Indeed, according to some, scientific models are 
metaphors (Hesse, 1966; Bradie, 1998; Kittay, 1987; Kuhn, 1979). The models in scientific 
theories are not literally true. Rather they are devices that organise our experiences and our 
current state of knowledge. The theoretical model is the subsidiary subject through which 
elements of the empirical domain, the principal subject, are explained. In the process of model 
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construction and application, the empirical domain obtains a set of new attributions as a result 
of scientists’ thinking about it in terms of the theoretical model. Elements of the empirical 
domain are redescribed in terms of the model (Hesse, 1966; Bradie, 1998).  
 
Hesse (1966) fully explores these ideas. She argues that scientific models as metaphors play a 
critical role in redescribing and explaining the principal subject and highlights the importance 
of metaphor as a means for overcoming the absence of appropriate language with which to 
discuss new scientific discoveries. Hesse (1966) also identifies a particular role of analogy in 
scientific development. As mentioned throughout this paper, metaphors may create analogies 
between a principal subject and subsidiary subject. Hesse (1966, p.101-129) describes how 
these similarities, once identified, might justify the prediction of further analogies between 
the two subjects (Indurkhya, 1992). The arguments that may be derived through this process 
of analogical prediction cannot be deduced from existing knowledge (Indurkhya, 1992, 
p.316). That is, the conclusions that may be drawn are “…new knowledge beyond the logical 
limits of existing knowledge” (Indurkhya, 1992, p.316).   
 
An example of scientific model as metaphor is to be found in the deployment of the Brownian 
motion model in financial economics. The Brownian motion model developed by physicists 
has been used to explain the behaviour of asset prices on the stock exchange. Here, a 
theoretical (Brownian motion) model of asset prices is the subsidiary subject through which 
the principal subject (empirical asset prices) is explained. In so doing theorists redescribed the 
behaviour of stock market prices using the previously developed Brownian motion model 
from physics and in the process created an analogy between asset prices and the motion of 
microscopic particles. In one’s thoughts, the systems of the two subjects—all of one’s 
knowledge and beliefs about the motion of particles on the one hand and the movement of 
asset prices on the other—interact. Asset prices are now seen differently. Asset prices acquire 
the set of attributes of Brownian motion. They are viewed as independent and identically 
distributed events.  
 
Something may be said here of the improvements that (metaphorical) economic and scientific 
models may undergo over time. The Brownian motion model of asset prices is, in its basic 
characterization, a very poor metaphor. The Wiener process—the mathematical idealization 
of Brownian motion—exhibits continuity but not smoothness. That is, there are no breaks or 
gaps in the path that a particle traverses but the path is very jerky and haphazard. Asset prices 
also exhibit jerky and seemingly haphazard movements. However, asset prices are not always 
continuous and can (and do) experience gaps from one price to another price without 
‘touching’ any prices in between. This tendency of asset prices to ‘jump’ has, however, been 
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accounted for in the more sophisticated metaphorical re-descriptions of asset prices as Wiener 
Brownian motion processes developed by modern finance theorists. It is certainly the case 
that metaphorical re-descriptions are far from static phenomena and must be judged carefully 
with potential for improvement acknowledged.  
 
Metaphor has proven so useful because it enables us to think about one thing in terms of 
another. That is, it is a cognitive apparatus. The creation of analogies between a principal 
subject in which increased understanding is sought and a subsidiary subject may contribute 
new information or insights about the principal subject. Metaphor is a device that may be 
usefully deployed whenever new objects or situations are being investigated. This utility 
derives from the ability that metaphor gives scientists and other scholars to explain the 
principal subject, which may be a new field of research, in terms of a subsidiary subject that 
has already been thoroughly investigated and explained. We need categories and concepts to 
structure our thoughts. When the problem is new, characterising it in terms of something 
familiar may greatly assist the development of our understanding (Pylyshyn, 1979).  
 
In addition, metaphors in science serve as heuristic tools providing a procedure for arriving at 
new solutions and rhetorical devices providing a way to express new or existing ideas in a 
more effective or persuasive manner (Bradie, 1998). When the development of knowledge in 
a particular area stalls because the presently deployed tools of investigation have been 
exhausted, the creation of analogies between this principal subject and a subsidiary subject 
may permit the generation of new solutions. Scholars operating at the frontiers of their fields 
may deploy the rhetorical function of metaphor to inform their colleagues of the nature of 
their discoveries and persuade their colleagues of the importance of their discoveries. Skill 
with language and the ability to impress people with such a skill plays no small part in the 
communication and subsequent acceptance of new ideas. This, then, is how metaphor may 
assist the development of science and knowledge. 
 
6 METAPHORS AS RETARDANTS OF ADVANCES IN UNDERSTANDING 
 
On the downside, there are some substantial caveats associated with the use of metaphor of 
which scientists must beware. Metaphor can create distortions (Bradie, 1999). These 
distortions arise when features of the subsidiary subject are mistakenly attributed to the 
principal subject. In this case, the cross-domain mappings between principal and subsidiary 
domains import features from the subsidiary domain into the principal domain that yield a 
misguided comprehension of the principal subject. For example, in the early twentieth 
century, physicists were embarking upon an exciting research program that sought to 
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determine the structure of the atom. Niels Bohr, physicist and Nobel Prize winner, proposed a 
model of the atom that depicts an atom as a small nucleus orbited by electrons in a structure 
analogous to a solar system: 
 
Figure 1 
The Bohr Model of the Atom 
Nucleus
Orbiting 
Electron
Permissible 
Orbits
 
 
Unfortunately, the Bohr model, useful and important as it was during its heyday, is an 
example of an ultimately mistaken attribution of features of a subsidiary subject (solar 
system) to a principal subject (the atomic structure). The atomic structure is actually rather 
different from a miniature solar system, a fact that was made clear by the newer generation of 
quantum mechanics. A second source of distortion derives from the tendency of metaphor to 
emphasise certain characteristics of the principal subject and push others aside. This may be a 
significant problem if the characteristics that are pushed aside are in fact more important than 
those that are emphasised.  
 
Omission or neglect of important features of the principal subject is something that must be 
guarded against. Black (1962) provides a good example. Say that we decide to use the 
vocabulary of chess to generate a description of war or battle. In so-doing there is the 
potential for us to neglect certain important aspects of the principal subject (warfare). As 
Black (1962, p.42) points out, “The vocabulary of chess has its primary uses in a highly 
artificial setting, where all expression of feeling is formally excluded: to describe a battle as if 
it were a game of chess is accordingly to exclude, by the choice of language, all the more 
emotionally disturbing aspects of warfare.” The qualities of the principal subject that are 
emphasised in metaphor, and those which are not, are important sources of potential problems 
inherent in the utilisation of metaphor. Mathematical economics is not exempt from these 
problems.  
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 Whilst mathematical economics may be accepted as an understandable contribution to the 
discourse on economic reality, by emphasising those facets of particular economic elements 
that may be talked about in terms of particular mathematical objects many other possibly 
more important facets are swept aside. For example, culture is an important component of our 
world and influences the way in which the economic system functions. Yet it is all but 
impossible to metaphorically redescribe this particular element of our economic system in 
terms of mathematical objectsi. The very choice of mathematical vocabulary by mathematical 
economists excludes important aspects of the world around us from analysis. Just as metaphor 
is only one component of language that can be utilised to express ideas, mathematical 
economics is only one component of language that can be utilised to convey meaningful 
insights into economic reality. However, the meaning of mathematical economics will not be 
clear if the mathematical economic theory lacks visualisability. 
 
7 ECONOMIC VISUALISABILITY       
 
Visualisability is one thing about metaphors that we must discuss before drawing this paper to 
a close. Visualisability is the ability of metaphors to invoke imagesii. Visualisability is 
important in all sciences that deploy mathematical models that create analogies between the 
elements of a principal subject and mathematical objects. It is useful for scientists to be able 
to visualise nature in operation. At the beginning of the twentieth century, physicists’ biggest 
challenge as they strove towards a theory of atomic structure was the difficulty in visualising 
what was happening inside the atom. Bohr’s model provided one possible picture of the 
atomic structure. The physicist confronted with Bohr’s model of atomic structure can picture 
or visualise that structure as a miniature solar system. The Bohr model (metaphor) creates an 
analogy that permits the visualisation of the principal subject through the filter (see Black 
(1955, p.545)) of the subsidiary subject. The Bohr model provided a starting point for further 
investigation, both theoretical and experimental.  
 
The images invoked by metaphors need not be clear diagrammatic pictures. They can be more 
like sensations with a complex kinaesthetic or intuitive property (Gleick, 1992). The 
development of a new theory often begins with such an image invoked in the scientist’s own 
mind as he or she thinks about a principal subject in terms of a subsidiary one. Metaphor is a 
uniquely powerful way of communicating to others the insight that the scientist has glimpsed 
and invoking in them the same image of how an element of nature operates. Thinking about 
metaphor as invoking images leads us back to our discussion on metaphor and meaning. 
There is not really a hidden meaning within any metaphorical expression but a cognitive 
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content that has no literal equivalent. The created analogy presented to a suitable reader or 
listener invokes an image. In science, this fulfils the role of connecting elements of nature 
together and providing new paths to follow towards their explication.  
 
Mathematical models as metaphors have the ability to invoke images. At a fundamental level, 
mathematical equations may invoke their geometrical counterparts in the thoughts of the 
reader or listener. In this case, the invoked images may indeed take the form of clean 
diagrammatic representations. At a more complex level, mathematical equations may invoke 
images of motion, deceleration, acceleration and pressure (Gleick, 1992). Mathematical 
equations in physics, for example, may invoke images of the flowing of liquid or, perhaps, 
images of waves of particles or individual particles moving through space and time or a 
‘field’. These invoked images cannot be depicted in a neat diagrammatic picture—indeed the 
elements of nature that are described by such mathematical models are not literally waves or 
points in space-time (hence the metaphorical nature of the models). Such images have a 
kinaesthetic or intuitive property picked up by the ‘physical intuition’ of the physicist.  
 
In economics, visualisability is important. Mathematical economic theory can create 
analogies between economic elements and mathematical objects that permit economists to see 
and understand those economic elements in a new and different way. A demand schedule, 
particularly in its geometric form, is an example of a piece of mathematical economic theory 
that has a high level of visualisability. It is very vivid. Upon hearing the statement, “Let the 
quantities that economic agents will demand of a certain good at certain prices be the function 
,” the suitable reader or listener can visualise the quantities demanded by an 
economic agent at a certain price as an inverse relationship or a downward-sloping curve. 
When dynamics are added, it is equally easy to visualise demand and supply functions 
moving fluidly with new equilibria occurring at their intercept. Even in the case of higher 
dimensions (hyper planes), when there is no recourse to geometry, the equilibrium adjustment 
process may be sensed kinaesthetically or intuitively as a searching for the variables that 
simultaneously solve a system of equations
bPaQd −=
iii.  
 
Economic visualisability is important because it is the images invoked by mathematical 
metaphors in economics—in the first instance, in the mind of the mathematical economist and 
in the second instance in the mind’s of those to whom he communicates his theory—that may 
help to propel the development of knowledge in our science. Unfortunately, there would 
appear to be a tendency in contemporary mathematical economics towards low visualisability. 
As mathematical economics becomes more abstract, the analogies created between economic 
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elements and mathematical objects tend to become stretched and clouded and the distance 
between the principal subject and subsidiary subject becomes a widening gulf. There is a 
danger, under such circumstances, that such abstract mathematical economic theory may 
cease to invoke images that compel economists to see and understand the economic system in 
a new and different way. In this way, low visualisability or a lack of vividness may diminish 
the effectiveness of the mathematical metaphors that have proven so important to the 
development of economic theory.  
 
Perhaps the main contributing factor to low visualisability is the tendency of theorists to 
create metaphors within metaphors. From the viewpoint of economic theory, once the 
mathematical analogues for economic elements were created, it became possible to construct, 
upon this basis, a framework of metaphors within metaphors. As mentioned above, the 
importation of some of the logic of mathematics into the principal domain of economics 
facilitates systematic mappings that can be maintained from one (mathematical) metaphorical 
re-description of an economic element to the next. Debreu (1984; 1991), for example, 
explains that if all agents in the economy are in equilibrium relative to a given price-vector, 
the state of the economy is Pareto optimal (Debreu, 1984, p.268). Debreu also speaks about 
solving the equilibrium existence problem by casting a competitive economy in the form of a 
game-theoretic system and of how Martin Shubik linked Edgeworth’s contract curve to the 
theory of the core. These are examples of metaphor within metaphor. Edgeworth’s contract 
curve created an analogy and Shubik created an analogy between Edgeworth’s metaphor and 
another mathematical object. The result is that the newly created analogy is now a further step 
away from the element of economic reality that the theorist really wants to tell us about. Each 
creation of metaphor within metaphor has the potential to reduce economic visualisability.  
 
It might be said that the tendency towards low visualisability is always a distinct possibility 
whenever mathematics comes to be used in scientific work. The possibility of new knowledge 
to be discovered through the construction of metaphor within metaphor or the systematic 
deployment of cross-domain mappings, presents an almost irresistible allure (see Indurkhya’s 
(1992, p.316) comments on predictive analogy). Mathematical models as metaphors can assist 
the task of discovering and stating connections between elements of economic reality but it is 
important to remember that the mathematical metaphors in economics have the potential, like 
all metaphor, to create distortions or otherwise mislead. Due consideration must be given to 
these problems as well as to the vividness of the metaphors and the visualisability of the 
connections that they create between mathematical objects and economic elements.  
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, I have argued that mathematics in economics involves the construction of 
metaphor and that mathematical metaphors have no strict equivalence in the field of literal 
expression. I have also introduced the concept of visualisability to economic science and 
linked it to the image-invoking property of metaphor. The construction of metaphors, both 
mathematical and literary, is indispensable to the development of knowledge in economics. 
Metaphors allow us to see things in new and different ways and provide an effective way of 
communicating the images that may come to the scientist in a moment of inspiration. 
Metaphor plays a valuable part in this process. This role is likely to be more effective and 
valuable if the metaphors of economics invoke clear, vivid images. It is important, therefore, 
for economists to consider the visualisability of the metaphors in economic theory. Vivid and 
visualisable mathematical economics may communicate new discoveries more effectively 
than metaphors in which the connections between mathematical objects and economic 
elements are faint and clouded by a gulf between principal and subsidiary subject. It must 
always be remembered, in addition to this, that complete discourse on the nature of economic 
reality—the entire theoretical structure of economic science—requires the deployment of a 
range of linguistic phenomena. The utilisation of mathematics in economics and all of its 
strengths and weaknesses in this regard are language-based.  
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i Even if it were possible to some extent, only those facets of culture that could be talked about in 
mathematical terms would be emphasised.  
ii Aristotle appears to have this quality in mind when he discusses vividness (Rhetoric, Ch.3.11).  
 
iii The preference for two or three dimensional mathematics that Samuelson (1952) finds difficult to 
understand, is due to the ease with which such mathematics may be visualised. Having no physical 
experience with higher dimensions makes mathematical objects like hyper-planes practically 
unvisualisable for most people.    
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